NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVE

Jail Evacuation Planning and Implementation

Participant Notebook & Resource Guide

Office for Domestic Preparedness

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FACT SHEET

National Sheriffs' Association (NSA)

The National Sheriffs' Association is a non-profit organization dedicated to raising the level of professionalism among law enforcement leaders across the nation. Throughout its 63 years, the NSA has been involved in numerous programs to enable sheriffs, deputies, chiefs of police, and others in law enforcement to perform their jobs in the best possible manner and to better serve the people of their counties or jurisdictions. The NSA offers training information and recognition to sheriffs, deputies, and other policing officials throughout the nation and has forged cooperative relationships with local, state, and federal law enforcement.

For more information on NSA and additional training opportunities, contact the NSA training director at 1-800-424-7827.

Module 1 — Reasons, Goals and Objectives

1-1

Reasons for Attending



1-2

Seminar Goals

1. Increase awareness of **the need to plan** for a **jail evacuation** in response to a hazardous incident.
2. Increase knowledge of **potential threats** to jails and **possible responses** to hazardous incidents.
3. Increase knowledge of **planning required to execute a** jail evacuation in response to a hazardous incident.

1-5

Seminar Objectives

1. Define **potential threats** to a jail that would require evacuation.
2. Provide information concerning how to obtain **current threat information.**
3. Establish procedures for developing **plans, policies, and exercises** for a jail evacuation.

1-6

Seminar Objectives (continued)

4. Provide information on activities required in **the first hours following a hazardous incident.**
5. Establish procedures for conducting a **jail evacuation** in response to a hazardous incident.
6. Provide information concerning **necessary coordination at site** where inmates will be evacuated.
7. Establish procedures for **returning to jail facility.**

1-7

Module II

TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

2-1

Terrorism

USC Title 22, Section 2656f(d):
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

U.S. Department of Justice:
A violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any segment to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):
The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

2-2

Common Elements of Terrorism

- Violent Illegal Actions
- To Further Political or Social Objectives
- Influence or Intimidate a Target Population
- Intended to Coerce a Government or its Civilian Population

2-3

Terrorists & Terrorism

- **Domestic Terrorism**
  - –Right-wing Terrorism
  - –Left-wing Terrorism
  - –Special Interest Terrorism
  - –Splinter Groups
  - –Lone Perpetrator
- **International Terrorism**
  - –State Sponsors of Terrorism
  - –Lone Perpetrator

2-4

Types of Terrorist Targets

- ***Primary targets*** - most critical or valuable to terrorist
  - People
  - Infrastructure
  - Property
- ***Secondary targets*** - specific overall importance, but not main focus of effort
- ***Targets of opportunity***

2-5

Factors Affecting Target Selection

- Target Attractiveness
- Potential for Success
- Potential for Avoiding Identification and Capture



2-6

INFORMATION ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

What is a Weapon of Mass Destruction?

2-7

Legal Definition—18 USC

- Poison Gas
- Any Weapon Involving a Disease Organism
- Any Weapon Designed to Release Radiation or Radioactivity at a Level Dangerous to Human Life
- Any Destructive Device as Defined in Section 921 of this Title

2-8

6 Categories of WMD

Biological

Nuclear

Incendiary

Chemical

Explosive

Radiological

2-9

Routes of Exposure

- Inhalation
- Ingestion
- Absorption
- Injection

2-10

Reducing Exposure

TIME

DISTANCE

SHIELDING

RESULT

- Upwind, Uphill & Upstream

2-11

Persistent vs. Non-Persistent

- Persistent Agent
  - Lethal concentrations will last in target areas for more than 12 hours
  - Hazards from both vapor and liquid may exist for hours, days, or in exceptional cases, weeks after dissemination of the agent
- Non-Persistent Agent
  - Lethal concentrations will not last in the target area for more than 12 hours.
  - Hazards are predominantly posed by vapor, will exist for minutes or, in exceptional cases, hours after dissemination of the agent

2-12

Biological Agents

Bacteria
Anthrax
Plague
Tularemia
Brucellosis

Rickettsia
Q Fever

Virus
Smallpox
Viral Equine Encephalitis
Viral Hemorrhagic Fever

Toxins
Botulinum Toxins
Staphylococcal Enterotoxins
Ricin
Mycotoxins

2-13

Nuclear Weapons

Three Techniques for Release of Nuclear Material

- Fission Device

- Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)

- Disrupting Water Supply at Facility

2-14

Chemical Agents

- Nerve
- Blister
- Blood
- Choking
- Irritant

2-15

Incendiary Devices

- 20-25% of all domestic bombings & most reliable
- Components
  - Ignition Source
  - Combustible Filler
  - Housing or Container
- Common Materials
  - Roadway Flares
  - Gasoline/Motor Oil
  - Light Bulbs
  - Matches/Fireworks
  - Electrical Components
  - Propane Cylinders
  - Plastic Pipes, Bottles and Cans

2-16

Explosives

- Approximately 70% of domestic terrorist incidents involve explosives



Examples:

- Vehicle Bombs
- Pipe Bombs
- Satchel Charges

2-17

Key Concept: Detection Delay



2-18

Module III - The Threat



Jail as a Target

Why would the jail be a:
Primary Target?
Secondary Target?
Target of Opportunity?

3-2

Types of Threats

- Contaminating Water
- Explosions/Bombing of Building
- Gases and Poisons (both from attack and from accident – train derailment)
- Biological Incident (from inside or outside, from inmates or staff)

3-6

Prevention

- Target Hardening
  - Uniforms
  - Credentials
    - Different shapes, sizes and/or colors for clerical staff, support staff, volunteers, etc.
    - Acceptable ID for official, professional and personal visitors

3-7

Facility Vulnerability Assessment

Have you completed a vulnerability assessment on your facility?



3-8

Key Assessment Areas

- Location of facility
- Facility Description
  - Floor plan
  - Entrances and other access points
  - Windows
  - Utilities
  - Security Systems
  - Lighting
- Communication Systems

3-9

Key Assessment Areas (continued)

- Emergency equipment
- Duress or Emergency codes
- Logistical and Resource Concerns
  - Food and water
  - Transportation
  - Medical supplies

3-10

Mini Threat Assessment

1. What are the principle threats to your facility?
2. What other buildings, not under your control, affect your facility?
3. What are the important utilities for the facility and who controls the access?
4. Who are the emergency responders and what is the ETA of each?
5. What is the surrounding terrain that might affect the security of your facility?

3-11

Threat and Incident Information

- General information concerning threats
  - Pre-Event
  - Event
- Specific threat information in your area
  - Pre-Event

3-12

Sources of Jail Intelligence

Information on inmates can be obtained by:

- Booking Staff
- Classification Interviewers
- Medical Staff
- Housing Officers

3-15

Sources of Jail Intelligence

Booking and Intake

- From Arresting/Transporting Authority
- From Inmate during in-processing
  - Intake officers should be skilled communicators
  - Personal property can yield clues
    - At intake
    - At change-up
- Outward signs such as scars, tattoos, clothing, jewelry, etc.

3-16

Sources of Jail Intelligence

Classification

- Primary function is gathering and coordinating information
- Should be trained and skilled interviewers
  - Able to interpret both verbal and non-verbal communications
- Another opportunity to look for scars, tattoos, etc.

3-17

Sources of Jail Intelligence

Housing Officers

- Have the most contact and access to inmates
  - Mail
  - Telephone
  - Visitors
  - Cellmates
- Usually the ones to develop "sources"

3-18

Module IV - Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies

Plans

Exercises

Contingencies

4-1

Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies: Plans and Policies

Proper planning includes:

- Developing and maintaining a jail evacuation plan
- Carrying out exercises to test the plan's effectiveness
  - Documenting the exercise for evaluation
- "War-gaming" possible contingencies

4-2

Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies: Plans and Policies

- Each agency should have a plan
- May be able to adapt from state-mandated Disaster Preparedness Plan
- May also adapt from model plans
- Plan should be reinforced by policy and amplified by SOPs
- Should have a schedule for periodic updating

4-3

Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies: Plans and Policies (continued)

Issues that must be addressed include:

- Short term vs. long term
- Multiple remote site possibilities
  - Different types and in different areas
  - Different sites for different custody levels
- Staffing
  - Extra security concerns
  - Medical and other support staff
  - Must have enough security personnel to secure facility, remote site and have armed personnel for transportation

4-4

Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies: Plans and Policies (continued)

Mutual Aid Agreements:

- Who's coming?
- What can they bring?
- How long can they stay?
- Who's paying for it?

Documentation of all occurrences

- Designate "scribes" at key activity locations
- Will need for court challenges and financial reimbursement requests

4-5

Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies: Plans and Policies (continued)

Issues that must be addressed include:

- Use of deadly force
  - Must also inform mutual aid agencies and inmates (if applicable)
- Communications Plan
  - Who will use what channel or device
- Possible release of low custody/low risk inmates
  - Need written agreements with courts
  - Need written instructions for return when jail reopens

4-6

Plans, Exercises & Contingencies: Plans and Policies (continued)

Issues that must be addressed include:

- Security equipment
  - Waist and/or gang chains
  - Flex-cuffs
    - Enough for every inmate to and from remote site
- Protective equipment
  - Airpacks for staff
  - Escape hoods for inmates
- Records movement or access to records
  - Administrative and Medical

4-7

Plans, Exercises & Contingencies: Plans and Policies (continued)

Issues that must be addressed include:

- Transportation
  - Secure and special needs vehicles
  - Sources outside of agency
  - Who moves first (minimum or maximum)
    - According to custody level to decrease potential for incidents
    - Segregated and PC may have to be moved separately.
  - Security of route(s)
    - Vary routes to prevent ambush?

4-8

Plans, Exercises & Contingencies: Plans and Policies (continued)

Issues that must be addressed include:

- Resource needs at remote sites
  - Food Preparation and Distribution
    - Drinking water
  - Bathing and restroom facilities
  - Equipment and Supplies housing
    - Secure space for armory, medications, etc.
  - Classification and Separation needs
    - Male/female/juvenile
    - Protective custody
    - Custody levels
  - Location of nearest medical facilities from each site

4-9

Plans, Exercises & Contingencies: Exercises

- All personnel should have initial training
- All personnel must be trained in protective equipment
- Specific training for specified groups
- Exercises good place to check coordination
- Training should be followed by table top exercises
- Planning and training should culminate in full scale evacuation exercise

4-10

Types of Exercises

Tabletop Training Exercise (TTX): Uses scenarios to evaluate plans, command and control, and coordination. Can also evaluate whether necessary resources are available.

Situational Training Exercise (STX): Similar to a TTX but with some limited play by field personnel. Evaluates logistics (communications, routes, etc.), clarify roles of personnel, determines if plans can be implemented in reality, and assesses capabilities of personnel.

4-11

Types of Exercises

Field Training Exercise (FTX): Full-run exercise using all necessary personnel, logistics, and resources. Inclusion of inmates as a part of the exercise is possible with careful pre-planning. The most realistic exercise will yield the most realistic results, however inclusion of actual inmates, even at the lowest custody level, involves some degree of risk.

4-12

Plans, Exercises, & Contingencies: Exercises (continued)

Monmouth County, New Jersey
Jail Evacuation Video

4-13

Goals of Exercises

- Evaluating the effectiveness of the plan
- Identifying problem areas
- Clarifying roles of participants
- Evaluating availability of logistics and resources

4-14

Plans, Exercises & Contingencies: Contingencies

- Officers may be mobilized for terrorist actions or war
- Law enforcement may be too busy to offer assistance
- Multiple jurisdiction incidents that cut off evacuation routes and sites
- Incident may occur inside the jail or during the move
- Security personnel at remote site may be needed in other evacuations
- Consider mutual aid agreements with other facilities/agencies

4-15

Module V – Response and Evacuation

5-1

Initial Response to an Incident

You have just been notified that a WMD incident has occurred near the jail.

You have 2 hours to completely evacuate before the contamination reaches the facility.

In 15 minute increments, map out what must be done to accomplish this successfully.

5-2

Making the Move

- Personnel—Assigned and in place
  - Everyone knows where to go and the route(s) to follow
  - Advance team is in place at the remote location
  - Lines of authority are clear
- Logistics
  - Special needs, medications, records, other equipment, etc.
- Transportation – in place, **gassed up** and ready to go
- All inmates are accounted for

5-7

Making the Move (continued)

- Security Of Convoy (From Both Inside Disturbances and Outside Attacks)
- May Require Special Needs Equipment
  - Wheel Chairs
  - Evacuation of Infirmaries

5-8

Module VI – Actions at the Remote Site

6-1

Actions at Remote Site

What type of actions need to be taken to reestablish operations once personnel and inmates are at remote site?

6-2

Module VII – Returning to the Facility



7-1

Phases of Action for Return to the Jail

What actions are necessary during each of the phases: at remote site, at the jail facility, and upon completion of move?

7-2


Managing WMD Incidents
Course Content
Planning
Exercise
Evaluate
Monitor for Changes
ID Terrorist Threat
Assess Threat
Continuous Process
C-1

APPENDIX A

TERMS

Biological Threats

Threats created by living organisms that may incapacitate or kill. Biological threats may result from unintentional exposure to such threats as malaria or AIDS or from intentional exposure to viruses such as anthrax or smallpox. Biological threats can be classified into two types: pathogens, which are living organisms that cause disease (such as viruses and bacteria), or toxins, which are non-living, poisonous substances produced by humans or as by-products of plants, animals, etc.

Chemical Threats

Threats created by exposure to toxic or noxious chemicals. Threats may be the result of an accident (truck or train accident) or may be an intentional attack (purposeful release of chemicals). Threats can range from discomfort caused by irritants to death from toxic gases.

Crisis Management

Measures taken to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or respond to a threat or act of terrorism. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response. The FBI is the lead agency in the case of a terrorist event.

Consequence Management

Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to people and organizations affected by the consequences of terrorism. FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management.

TERMS
(continued)

Hazardous Incident

Any incident that threatens the jail, inmates, and/or staff and that require immediate action in the form of an evacuation of the jail. Hazardous incidents may be natural disasters (floods, tornadoes, hurricanes), accidents (train derailments involving hazardous chemicals), criminal actions (bombs, jail breaks), or terrorist actions (use of weapons of mass destruction).

Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5 (HSPD- 5)

This is the United States "Policy on Counterterrorism." It directs a number of measures to reduce the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, to deter and respond to terrorist acts, and to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, explosive and radiological (BNICER) weapons. It also directs that Crisis Management and Consequence Management be conducted simultaneously.

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

Task force of law enforcement and other persons responsible for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. Typically headed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a JTTF exists in each of the FBI's 66 Field Offices.

Nuclear Threats

Threats created by radioactive materials or explosives. One type of nuclear threat is radiation created by exposure to radioactive materials, either as a result of an attack or accident. A more extreme nuclear threat is a militarized nuclear bomb. Other nuclear threats include "dirty bombs" which spread radioactive material through the use of conventional explosives.

TERMS
(continued)

Terrorism

The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Any weapon, device, or method that is designed or has the capability to cause death or serious injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of: radiation or radioactivity, a disease organism, or a toxic or poisonous chemical or their immediate precursors. Any substance that is designed or has the capability to cause death or serious injury.

APPENDIX B-1

INFORMATION ON TERRORISM

DEFINING TERRORISM

We have just discussed the concept of WMD—what WMD materials are and what they are not. Before we go any further in the course, we should also develop a working definition of terrorism. As with WMD, however, defining terrorism is probably a bit more difficult than it appears on the surface. For one, there are several definitions that are commonly used by the government.

> **USC Title 22, Section 2656f(d):**
> Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
>
> **U.S. Department of Justice:**
> A violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any segment to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
>
> **The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):**
> The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

All three definitions share important components. First of all, terrorism must involve an action, not simply a belief. That action must be unlawful, involve force or violence against members of a civilian population for the furtherance of political or social objectives, and be intended to coerce a government. Terrorists bypass the established institutions for effecting change in a society. They attempt to cause change by "terrorizing" citizens and forcing governments to modify policies in ways favorable to the terrorist cause.

COMMON ELEMENTS OF TERRORISM

The first thing to remember about terrorism is that it is criminal. When an individual commits a terrorist act, he or she is guilty of a crime, regardless of the virtue or perceived virtue of his or her cause and political objectives.

It is important to note, that the term terrorism normally does not include the attitudes and opinions of individuals. People have a right under the U.S. Constitution to their own opinions—even those that are unusual, unpopular, or otherwise out of the ordinary. For example, some people do not believe that humans should use animals for food and clothing. They have a right to that opinion. However, when that opinion (or many others) is expressed through actions that violate the law and meet the other conditions associated with terrorism, the individual is a terrorist and his or her actions constitute terrorism. In other words, people are not categorized as terrorists based on their opinions; they are categorized as terrorists based on their actions.

Some terrorists would like to be considered "freedom fighters" or "soldiers" who use extra-legal means to support their unpopular causes. However, terrorists are criminals when they violate the law—criminals who are entitled to no more or no less than other criminals. Even when we have some sympathy for an individual or group cause, we can have no sympathy for individuals who engage in unlawful violence to support that cause.

TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM

The FBI and other U.S. government agencies involved in combating terrorism further define terrorism using the following terms: *domestic terrorism* and *international terrorism; right-wing terrorism, left-wing terrorism,* and *special interest terrorism;* and *state sponsors of terrorism.*

Terrorism falls into two categories—international terrorism and domestic terrorism. Both categories are discussed below, beginning with domestic terrorism and terrorist groups that fall into that general category.

Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the United States and Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. government or population. The best-known examples of a recent domestic terrorist event is the Oklahoma City bombing. Domestic terrorist groups may have either Right-wing or Left-wing philosophies, or they may devote themselves to Special Interests.

Right-wing Terrorist Groups

The major themes espoused today by Right-wing terrorist groups are conspiracies, such as the New World Order, anti-gun-control laws, and white supremacy. Many right-wing extremist groups also articulate antigovernment or

anti-taxation sentiments and engage in survivalist and/or paramilitary training to ensure the survival of the U.S. as a white, Christian nation. A convergence of ideas has occurred among right-wing white supremacist groups. Efforts have been made by these groups to reduce openly racist views to appeal to a broader segment of the population and to focus more attention on antigovernment rhetoric and resistance to anti-Christian court decisions.

Many extremist right-wing organizations generally operate through political involvement within the established system. Most activity is verbal and is protected by the First Amendment right of free speech. Many members of extremist organizations are law-abiding citizens who have become intolerant of what they perceive to be violations of their constitutional rights. Certain extremists, however, such as some members of the "militia" or "patriot" movement, are unable to work within existing structures of government. These activists wish to remove federal involvement from a host of issues. For example, some militia members do not identify themselves as U.S. citizens and refuse to pay federal income taxes.

Membership in a militia organization is not an illegal activity in the United States. Law enforcement interest in the militia movement is based upon the rise of violence or potential for violence or criminal activity stemming from the militia movement. Militias are typically loose knit in nature. Adherents often are members of multiple groups, and because leaders of these groups tend to greatly inflate membership levels, actual group size is difficult to determine.

The most ominous aspect of the militias is the conviction, openly expressed by many members, that an impending armed conflict with the federal government necessitates paramilitary training and the stockpiling of weapons. Some militia members believe that federal authorities are enacting gun-control legislation to make it impossible for the people to resist the imposition of a "tyrannical regime" or a "one-world dictatorship." Many militia supporters believe the conspiracy involves the United Nations as well as federal authorities.

The growth of the militia movement can be traced, in part, to an effective communications system. Organizers promote their ideology not only at militia meetings but also at gun shows, patriot rallies, and gatherings of various other groups espousing antigovernment sentiments. Videotapes, computer bulletin boards, and networks are used with great effectiveness by militia sympathizers. Exploiting yet another medium, pro-militia fax networks disseminate material from well-known hate-group figures and conspiracy theorists.

Another phenomenon related to militias is the establishment of so-called "Common Law Courts." These courts, which have no legitimate legal basis, have self-appointed judges and juries and have issued "indictments" or "warrants"

against law enforcement and government officials who have investigated or the militia.

Left-wing Terrorist Groups

The United States still faces a threat from some leftist extremists, including Puerto Rican terrorist groups. Although Puerto Rico voted in 1993 to remain a U.S. Commonwealth, some extremists are still willing to plan and conduct terrorist acts to draw attention to their desire for independence. For example, prior to September 11, 2001, sixty percent of terrorist incidents on United States territory occurred in Puerto Rico.

Left-wing groups generally profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and view themselves as protectors of the American people against capitalism and imperialism. They aim to bring about a change in the United States and believe this can be accomplished only through revolution, such as well-orchestrated criminal actions, rather than participation in the established political process.

In the past, left-wing terrorist groups have claimed credit for numerous bombing attacks in the United States and Puerto Rico. These attacks have targeted military facilities, corporate offices, and federal buildings. Such groups believe bombings alone will not result in change, but they are tools to gain publicity for their cause and thereby earn the support of the masses. In the 1980s, the FBI dismantled many of these groups by arresting key members who were engaging in criminal activity. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also deprived many leftist groups of a coherent ideology or spiritual patron. As a result, membership and support for these groups has waned, and the threat has diminished.

Special Interest Terrorist Groups

"Special Interest" terrorism differs from traditional left-wing and right-wing terrorism in that specific, focused objectives are pursued, rather than widespread political change. Special interests espoused by these groups include animal rights, environmental preservation, and the right to life.

While the causes that special interest terrorist groups support may appear laudatory, their actions in support of those causes often involve criminal activity. These terrorist groups attempt through their violent criminal actions to force members of the general public to change attitudes about issues considered important to them.

Splinter Groups and Lone Perpetrators

Two final categories of domestic terrorists are splinter groups and lone perpetrators. Splinter groups normally include small numbers of people whose

views are so extreme that they are not welcome in more established groups. They are extremely dangerous because their activities are difficult to monitor and they are unconstrained by even minimal standards of conduct and behavior. Lone perpetrators are likewise dangerous because they can often avoid detection in their preparations for terrorist action. Lone perpetrators can often function for many years before they are identified and arrested.

International Terrorist Groups

International terrorism against the United States is foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States. The activities of these countries or groups transcend national boundaries. The current international terrorist threat to U.S. persons and interests continues from years past and can be divided into three categories: state sponsors of international terrorism, formalized terrorist groups, and loosely affiliated international radical extremists. It is also important to understand that international terrorist groups may fall into the same categories of philosophy as domestic terrorist groups: right-wing, left-wing, special interest, and splinter groups.

The first threat to Americans comes from the activities of state sponsors of international terrorism. State sponsors include Iran, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba and North Korea. In recent years, terrorist activities of Cuba and North Korea have declined due primarily to the deteriorating economic situations in both countries. However, the activities of Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Libya have continued.

State sponsors continue to view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Past activities included direct terrorist support and operations by official state agents. Following successful investigations that identified their involvement in terrorism, state sponsors now generally seek to conceal their support of terrorism by relying on surrogates to conduct actual operations. State sponsors, however, continue to engage in anti-Western terrorist activities by funding, organizing, networking, and providing other support and infrastructure to many extremists. A classic example of state-sponsored terrorism is the attack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, which killed 270 people. Two Libyan intelligence operatives were ultimately convicted for their role in the attack.

Formalized terrorist groups pose the second terrorist threat to U.S. interests. These autonomous organizations have their own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. They are able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns overseas and support terrorist operations inside the United States. Extremist groups such as Al Qaeda, Lebanese Hizballah, the Egyptian Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, and the Palestinian HAMAS have supporters inside the United States who could be used to support an act of terrorism here. Al Qaeda is

among the most dangerous of these groups. Hizballah has also staged numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Lebanon in 1984. Elements of the group were also responsible for the kidnapping and detention of U.S. hostages in Lebanon.

TARGETS OF TERRORISM

The probability that a particular individual or location will be targeted by a terrorist is a function of several factors:

- The attractiveness of the target. For example, jail facilities holding other terrorist might be attacked. Terrorists are also more likely to select targets where they anticipate extensive media coverage.
- The potential for successfully attacking the target. Hardened or well-protected targets are not likely to be selected. More vulnerable targets—where security measures are not likely to detect or neutralize an attack—are far more likely to be selected.
- The potential for avoiding identification and capture. Most terrorists will avoid targeting locations where there is a high probability of capture by law enforcement or security force personnel. (Keep in mind, however, that some terrorists are willing to die for their cause and will select targets regardless of the probability of identification or capture.)

Types of Terrorist Targets

Potential terrorist targets fall into one of three categories—Primary, Secondary, and Targets of Opportunity. A primary target is normally the most critical or valuable to a terrorist group. Primary targets can consist of people, infrastructure, and/or property (normally in this order of importance). Secondary targets are not necessarily the main focus of a terrorist group, but have some significance or importance. Finally, targets of opportunity are unanticipated; they may involve an unexpected vulnerability and afford the terrorist an opportunity to make a statement about his or her cause with little danger of detection, interdiction, or capture. Normally, targets of opportunity surface during preparations for an attack against a primary or secondary target.

APPENDIX B-2

INFORMATION ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Ask just about anyone to list weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and they will likely include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. They might even include radiological material disseminated using methods other than nuclear detonation. At the same time, however, conventional explosive events, such as the bombing in Oklahoma City, would probably also fit into the category of WMD—at least according to most definitions.

The task of defining WMD, however, is not as simple as it first appears. The legal definition, contained in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, defines WMD using some different criteria.

- Poison Gas
- Any Weapon Involving a Disease Organism
- Any Weapon Designed to Release Radiation or Radioactivity at a Level Dangerous to Human Life
- Any Destructive Device as Defined in Section 921 of this Title

The reference to a destructive device defined in Section 921 expands the definition significantly. Consider what constitutes a destructive device:

- Any explosive or incendiary or poison gas:
  - Bomb
  - Grenade
  - Rocket having a propellant charge of more than one-quarter ounce
  - Mine
  - Device similar to any of the devices described in preceding clauses
- Any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell) which may be readily converted to expel a projectile. . .with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter
- Any combination of parts. . .from which a destructive device can be assembled

This legal definition includes a lot of items that most people would not include in the category of WMD—such as grenades or other items that contain as little as one-quarter ounce of explosives.

ROUTES OF EXPOSURE

Routes of exposure is a critical concept that must be understood prior to studying individual WMD. Exposures occur through "routes" or pathways into the body. Chemical, biological and radiological materials, and explosive shrapnel can enter the body through four routes:

- Inhalation
- Ingestion
- Absorption
- Injection

REDUCING EXPOSURE

There is a simple equation for identifying actions that will reduce exposure to WMD material.



Reducing the concentration of an agent can be accomplished by increasing the distance from the contamination source or providing shielding to prevent the agent from actually touching the skin or entering the body. Buildings, vehicles, and other structures may provide some shielding from blast and incendiary effects.

TYPES OF HARM

Understanding how to protect yourself also requires understanding the types of harm. Each type of WMD has the potential to cause harm to humans. One commonly used classification system for harm categorizes weapons' effects into six categories.

- **Thermal hazards** occur when there is the potential of human exposure to products that are extremely hot or extremely cold. Explosives and incendiaries produce significant thermal hazards.

- **Radiological hazards** occur when there is the potential for human exposure to alpha, beta, gamma or neutron radiation. Radiological hazards are present following a nuclear detonation or exposure of victims to radiological materials in unshielded containers.

- **Asphyxiation hazards** occur when substances such as argon, helium, nitrogen, and other inert gases displace oxygen in the air. Other chemical substances such as carbon monoxide interfere with the blood's supply of oxygen by preventing oxygen from reaching the cells.

- **Chemical hazards** occur when there is the potential for human exposure to toxic chemical substances. Chemical weapons—nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents—produce chemical hazards. In addition, industrial chemicals such as chlorine, phosgene, and some insecticides can cause substantial physical damage to human subjects.

- **Biological hazards** include bacteria, viruses, or toxins that can cause disease or injury to human subjects. Weaponized material of this kind is extremely dangerous because its use may go undetected until it is too late to successfully treat victims exposed to it.

- **Mechanical hazards** include projectiles and shrapnel that can cause lacerations, abrasions, and punctures to unprotected persons.

PERSISTENT VERSUS NON-PERSISTENT AGENTS

In addition to the six categories on the last slide, chemical agents also are classified as persistent or non-persistent.

A persistent agent is one that remains in the target area for a long period of time. Hazards from both vapor and liquid may exist for hours, days or, in exceptional cases, for weeks after dissemination of the agent. For this course, persistent agents include chemicals that remain in the target area in lethal concentrations for more than 12 hours.

A non-persistent agent will remain in the target area for a relatively short period of time. The major hazard from these chemicals is posed by vapors, which can remain present for minutes after introduction of the agent (in some exceptional cases, vapor hazards may persist for and hour or more). For this course, lethal concentrations of non-persistent agents remain in the target area for less than twelve hours.

CATEGORIES OF WMD MATERIALS

WMD weapons/materials can be categorized in five groups: biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical and explosive.

Biological Incidents

Biological agent attacks will occur under one of two conditions—focused response or a public health emergency.

Focused Response

A focused response incident involves a single known point source of contamination. One example is an individual who stands up in a restaurant or theater, announces that the glass vial in his/her hand contains anthrax, then breaks the vial. Another example of focused response is when an individual opens an envelope and finds a substance in the envelope along with a note that states that the substance is anthrax.

Public Health Emergency

In a public health emergency, a large number of victims begin to experience similar symptoms and report to physicians' offices and emergency rooms for treatment. It often takes some medical investigation to determine the source and the nature of such incidents.

Biological Weapons

Biological weapons take the form of disease-causing organisms (bacteria, rickettsia or viruses) or toxins produced by living organisms. They can be categorized in three groups:

- *Bacteria* and *rickettsia* are single-celled organisms that cause a variety of diseases in animals, plants, and humans. They may also produce extremely potent toxins inside the human body. Rickettsia lives inside individual cells. NOTE: Rickettsia shares some characteristics with both bacteria and viruses.

- *Viruses* are much smaller than bacteria and use the reproductive mechanism of host cells to create more viruses.

- *Toxins* are potent poisons produced by a variety of living organisms including bacteria, plants, and animals. Biological toxins are some of the most toxic substances known. Ricin is 10,000 times more toxic than the SARIN nerve weapon used in the Tokyo subway attack.

Potential Biological Incident Indicators

- Unusual number of sick or dying people or animals downwind from an incident.
- Suspicious bombing incident with or without written or verbal threats. Be particularly careful in the area around bombing incidents where the bomb appeared to "fizzle." A failed or minimal explosion could suggest that the terrorist is using the bomb to disseminate biological, chemical, or radiological material.
- Unscheduled or unusual dissemination of sprayed material.
- Abandoned spray or dispersion device.
- Containers from laboratory or biological supply houses.

Obviously, distribution of casualties in a pattern that appears to follow wind direction is an indicator of biological, chemical, or radiological contamination. Keep in mind, however, that the delayed onset of symptoms associated with biological agents makes it unlikely that you will ever observe this phenomenon on a real-time basis. Rather, it will be discovered through investigation that the original symptomatic individuals were all in the same general area at about the same time.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Biological Agents

Advantages

Small quantities of biological agents are relatively easy to manufacture. Although not quite "high school" science, biological weapons can be made from readily available components by individuals with knowledge gained at the college level.

They are available. Biological pathogens can be obtained from nature, hospital labs, and university research facilities, among other places.

They are cheap. Biological weapons are called "the poor man's atomic bomb." One report quotes testimony before a UN panel that, "for a large-scale operation against a civilian population, [manufacturing enough agent to cause] casualties might cost about...$1 per square kilometer with biological weapons."

They can be spread throughout large areas by natural convection or air currents. Biological agents as dust or vapors move with the air. Ventilation systems in buildings or transportation facilities may actually become part of the dissemination system, carrying biological agents far from the initial source. One author reported a test in 1966 where harmless biological organisms were introduced into the Seventh and Eighth Avenue subways in New York City.

Within minutes they were detected at the extremities of the transportation system.

They require decontamination, tying up of resources, and increasing media attention. Once disseminated, biological agents can remain in the air as vapor or aerosols, or settle on surfaces. In some cases, a hazard can remain for many years. This attribute requires that facilities be monitored and decontaminated before being returned to service. Decontamination is a tedious, time-consuming, and resource intensive process which requires that personnel doing the work be fully protected from the effects of the agent.

Their psychological impact will extend far beyond their actual effect. The mere thought of imminent exposure to a biological agent causes a terror reaction in many people. The anthrax attacks soon after 9/11 are evidence of this.

It is difficult for civilian government agencies to prepare for biological terrorist incidents. Most local government emergency response agencies have some kind of HAZMAT response team available. While these teams and their equipment can form the core unit that responds to a terrorist biological incident, they are likely to be challenged beyond their current capability in terms of knowledge, manpower, and equipment. The numbers of potential casualties and the extent of the areas involved can quickly overwhelm the capabilities of any emergency response organization.

Disadvantages

Delayed effects can detract from the intended impact. Terrorist activities occur for the purpose of making a public political statement. Determining whether an outbreak of disease or illness is the result of natural causes or terrorism is a difficult task. This uncertainty as to the cause and the time delay in identifying effects can detract from the potency of the political statement or the credibility of the terrorist claim. This may be outweighed by the fear that is created. Even a hoax instills considerable fear.

Production of biological agents and devices is inherently hazardous to the terrorist. Although commonly available HAZMAT equipment may provide protection to the terrorist, there is some risk of exposure and infection.

Development of effective biological weapons requires numerous difficult steps. One report listed 16 steps required to plan and execute a biological terrorist attack that would kill millions; some steps would be difficult to complete. Problems cited included lack of knowledge, difficulty in obtaining equipment and materials, safety, risk of detection, and difficulty in preservation and dissemination.

Nuclear (Radiological) Incidents

Terrorists can employ nuclear material in one of three ways. They can actually detonate a fission device at the target. They can employ another means to disperse radiological material at the target. Or, they can select a target that already houses radiological material and use a conventional explosion or similar means to cause dispersal of that material (such as destroying the water supply at a nuclear reactor, potentially causing a nuclear core meltdown and the release of nuclear material). Terrorists can use nuclear material to destroy a target or to contaminate it in a manner that denies human access.

Terrorist nuclear incidents will most likely involve the use of a radiological dispersion device or other means to spread nuclear materials. Intelligence sources report that the use of a nuclear device to cause a nuclear detonation is highly unlikely, if not nearly impossible.

Identifying a nuclear incident may be difficult for two reasons—radiation cannot be detected by the senses and symptoms of radiological exposure are generally delayed for hours or days. Also, radiological devices are not always delivered in large crates that are clearly marked with warning placards. A simple briefcase containing explosive material and a gamma source could be used to introduce nuclear contamination at a target.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Nuclear Devices

Advantages

They are available. Radiological materials are found in many facilities, such as research labs and in industry. In fact, most homes have radioactive material (in smoke detectors).

They require decontamination, tie up response resources, and generate extensive media attention. Once disseminated, nuclear devices contaminate an area and that contamination can remain in the area for many years. As a consequence, contaminated areas often require evacuation and monitoring over extended periods. Decontamination may be accomplished if workers can be protected from radiation levels. Radiological decontamination, however, is difficult and time-consuming.

The psychological impact of nuclear or radiological attack is likely to be substantial.

Total preparation for nuclear or radiological incidents is difficult, if not impossible. Consider the impact of a nuclear explosion—extensive damage to infrastructure

and hundreds or thousands of casualties. Typical emergency response capabilities on the local and state level would be taxed beyond attainable levels. Federal response capabilities, particularly in the short term, would be challenged. Even an attack involving dispersion of radiological material (without a nuclear explosion) would be a devastating event, particularly if the area of contamination was extensive.

Nuclear terrorism represents a significant escalation of terrorism. The detonation of a fission (nuclear) device is probably the worst case scenario among potential terrorist events, at least in terms of immediate, substantial, and dramatic impact.

Disadvantages

Most nuclear weapons devices are large, heavy, and extremely dangerous, thus creating manufacturing and handling problems for terrorists and increasing the risk of detection. The theft of nuclear weapons in rail or motor shipments (in the U.S.) is unlikely because of administrative and security controls implemented in support of such movements.

Delayed effects associated with the non-explosive dissemination of radiological material detract from the immediate impact of such actions.

Production of nuclear devices is inherently hazardous to the terrorist. Providing adequate shielding from radiological material is difficult to accomplish; however, such problems can be overcome by a knowledgeable individual.

The fabrication of a nuclear weapon is a complex and difficult process. One's lack of knowledge, difficulty in obtaining equipment and materials, safety, and risk of detection can lead to difficulty in preservation and dissemination which makes this a lesser weapon of choice.

They are expensive to make. A program to produce a fissionable device would probably cost hundreds of millions of dollars; obtaining material from black market sources would cost less but would still be extremely expensive.

Incendiary Devices

Terrorists have used incendiary devices for centuries. These devices are capable of causing property damage from the fire, loss of life, and generating panic among the public. Incendiaries have an added value to terrorists as they can spread to other combustibles and increase the amount of damage. Fires will continue to burn until all available fuel is consumed, oxygen is used up, or the fire is extinguished.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has used incendiary devices throughout Europe for many years. Their attacks have resulted in deaths, injuries, and tremendous monetary losses.

Incendiary devices are most dangerous when a warning does not precede them. These devices can cause collateral injuries, such as crushing injuries, trauma, respiratory, and cardiac emergencies, when panic sets in. These injuries are not as common during an orderly evacuation, which occurs when preceded by a warning.

It is difficult to determine whether an incident involving an incendiary is terrorism or simple arson involving insurance fraud, non-terrorist criminal activity, or other action. Remember that an incident is not a "terrorist incident" until a formal determination has been made based on all the evidence associated with an incident.

Incendiary devices are commonly used because they are relatively easy to fabricate. They are typically constructed of readily available materials such as roadway flares, gasoline and electrical components.

Incendiary devices consist of three components: ignition source, combustible filler material, and housing or container. An ignition source is needed to initiate the incendiary reaction. Combustible filler material provides the bulk of the material that actually ignites, while the housing or container is required to hold the filler.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Incendiary Devices

Advantages

- They are very easy to make.
- They are very inexpensive to make.
- A very small amount of material can cause vast devastation.
- They can be carried in everyday use common containers.
- They are easy to transport.
- They can be placed and hidden easily.
- They are extremely easy to initiate and operate.
- In many instances there is little if any evidence after functioning.

Disadvantages

- Many of the materials are extremely volatile and can evaporate prior to ignition. The ignition systems and the materials themselves can be affected by weather conditions.

- If the materials fail to ignite, the remaining materials are a good source of evidence for the criminal prosecution of the terrorist.
- Some of the materials that require mixing are extremely sensitive during mixing and transportation and can pre-ignite prior to their placement, causing injury or death to the terrorist.
- In some instances, the materials may not cause enough damage and thus not achieve all of the terrorists' demands, causing them to have to use another device or attack the target again.

Chemical Agents

Chemical agents fall into one of five categories:

Nerve Agents

Nerve agents are some of the most toxic chemicals ever developed. They are hazardous in their liquid and vapor states and can cause death within minutes of exposure.

In the military classification of these nerve agents, "G" refers to German origin, and the letter following the "G" is derived from the name of the scientist primarily responsible for developing that chemical. The letter "V" stands for venom, and the "X" following the "V" refers to a chemical series. Examples of these classifications include:

- Tabun (GA)
- Sarin (GB)
- Soman (GD)
- Thickened Soman (TGD)
- V Agent (VX)

Exposure to these agents typically occurs via airborne vapors or direct skin contact with the liquid. "G" series nerve agents are normally considered non-persistent. They evaporate at about the same rate as water (1 to 2 days). "V" series nerve agents, on the other hand, are considered persistent and can remain in a target area for days or months. Routes of exposure for nerve agents include skin absorption, inhalation, ingestion, and injection.

Inhalation of Vapors. A small exposure to vapor can cause pinpoint pupils (miosis), runny nose (rhinorrhea), and mild difficulty breathing. Large exposures can cause sudden loss of consciousness, convulsions, temporary breathing stoppage (apnea), flaccid paralysis, copious secretions, and death.

Liquids on the Skin. Depending on the degree of exposure, symptoms can range from localized sweating, nausea, vomiting, and a feeling of weakness to sudden loss of consciousness, seizures, breathing stoppage, copious secretions, paralysis, and death. VX is more persistent and harder to decontaminate from the skin than the other common nerve agents. It has the consistency of motor oil. Victim symptoms can include localized sweating, nausea, vomiting, feeling of weakness, miosis, runny nose, difficulty breathing, and uncontrolled muscle movement and bodily functions. Victims may report the presence of a fruity odor.

Vesicants (Blister Agents)

Vesicants (blister agents) cause red skin (erythema), blisters, irritation, eye damage, respiratory damage, and gastrointestinal damage. Their effect on exposed tissue is somewhat similar to that of a corrosive chemical like lye or a strong acid. These agents are particularly effective for targeting emergency response personnel because signs and symptoms are delayed. They work well as part of a secondary device because their delayed action gives emergency responders a false sense of security during the actual period of exposure.

In the classification system devised for the mustard agents, the letter "H" is derived from the German word for "hot stuff." The rest of the letters in these designations reflect other characteristics of the chemical. Distilled and nitrogen mustards were developed because common mustard gas (H) freezes at 50 degrees Fahrenheit and is, therefore, unusable in colder climates. The following are common vesicants:

- Mustard (H)
- Distilled Mustard (HD)
- Nitrogen Mustard (HN1, HN2, HN3)
- Lewisite (L)

Exposure to vesicants can occur through contact with either liquid or vapor forms of these chemicals. The warmer the climate or surface area to which the agent is applied, the more easily vapors are produced. The mustard agents are persistent from one day to several months under normal use and conditions. However, Lewisite's persistency is shorter than the mustards and is very short under wet or humid conditions.

The primary effects of mustard, distilled mustard, and nitrogen mustards occur in the eye, airways, and skin. Absorbed mustard may produce effects in other bodily systems as well.

Reddening (erythema) is the mildest and earliest form of skin injury appearing after exposure to mustard. It resembles sunburn and is associated with itching or

a burning, stinging pain. Erythema begins to appear from 2 to 24 hours after vapor exposure. Typical uniform material provides no protection from this type of injury.

The primary airway lesion from mustard causes death of the mucosa, with later damage to the musculature of the airways if the inhalation exposure is large. The common cause of death in mustard poisoning is respiratory failure.

The eyes are the organs most sensitive to mustard vapor injury. The time between exposure and visible injury (latent period) is shorter for eye injury than for skin injury.

The gastro-intestinal tract is very susceptible to mustard damage, either from systemic absorption or ingestion of the agent.

The effects of mustard on the central nervous system remain poorly defined. Animal studies demonstrate that mustards (particularly the nitrogen mustards) are convulsants. There are several human case reports describing victims of heavy exposure; they experienced neurological effects just prior to death. Reports from World War I, and more recently from Iran, describe people exposed to small amounts of mustard as appearing sluggish, apathetic, and lethargic.

The effects of Lewisite are similar to those of the mustards but occur far more quickly after exposure. Lewisite causes immediate pain or irritation of skin and mucous membranes. Delayed symptoms include erythema and blisters on the skin and eye. Also, airway damage will develop later in a manner similar to that caused by the mustards. It is not known whether Lewisite has ever been used against human subjects. The immediate onset of exposure symptoms makes Lewisite exposure easier to identify than exposure to mustards.

There is an antidote for Lewisite called The British Anti-Lewisite Cream. This is a military product but may be available to emergency response organizations.

Victim symptoms may include immediate eye pain, loss of sight, immediate skin pain, reddening of the skin, blistering, nausea, vomiting, hoarseness, loss of voice, fever, apathy, and depression. Victims may report an odor of garlic or geraniums.

Blood Agents

Cyanides or blood agents include common industrial chemicals, such as potassium cyanide, which can cause rapid respiratory arrest and death. These effects occur because the agent does not allow oxygen to be carried to cells and organs through the bloodstream.

Cyanide and cyanide compounds are common industrial chemicals. Under pressure, blood agents are liquids, but in pure form, they are gases. Examples of blood agents include the following:

- Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) – used in "gas chambers"
- Cyanogen Chloride (CK)

Exposure can occur through contact with either liquids or vapors. Due to the high degree of volatility of these compounds, the liquid rapidly vaporizes and disperses. Blood agents are non-persistent. They dissipate rapidly (within minutes) and evaporate faster than gasoline.

Hemoglobin carries oxygen to the cells and carbon dioxide back to the lungs for disposal. Cyanides react with the iron in hemoglobin and prevent it from properly taking up and dispensing oxygen and carbon dioxide. The effect is the same as asphyxiation, but more sudden.

Victim symptoms may include increased rate and depth of breaths, great difficulty breathing, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, headaches, convulsions, and onset of cardiac symptoms (i.e., cessation of respiration and heartbeat). Exposure to high concentrations can lead to seizures and to respiratory and cardiac arrest. Some victims may report an odor of bitter or burnt almonds or peach kernels.

Choking Agents

Pulmonary or choking agents include common (and readily available) industrial chemicals such as chlorine (CL) and phosgene (CG), which can cause eye and airway irritation, dyspnea, chest tightness, and delayed pulmonary edema. Although classified as choking agents, chlorine and phosgene can cause death if exposure levels are sufficient. As an example, inhalation of chlorine results in contact with the moisture in your lungs; the chlorine undergoes a chemical change to hydrochloric acid. As a consequence, the lungs rapidly fill with more fluids, resulting in less lung capacity to exchange oxygen. As more and more fluids build up, less and less oxygen is transferred; a person can literally drown in his/her own bodily fluids. Persons who usually survive this type of exposure will have some loss of lung capacity due to scarring of the lungs, which prevents oxygen transfer.

Chlorine was the first battlefield gas used by Germany in World War I. Choking agents are non-persistent; however, they may persist for longer than normal periods in low-lying or enclosed areas.

Inhalation is the route of exposure. Exposure is through inhalation of vapors. The primary effect is pulmonary edema. The victim's lungs fill with fluid and

victims develop severe pneumonia. Symptoms include eye and airway irritation, dyspnea, chest tightness, and delayed pulmonary edema.

Victim symptoms may include nausea, vomiting, coughing, choking, chest tightness, and delayed pulmonary edema. Victims may also report odors such as chlorine bleach or swimming pool odors (chlorine) and the odor of newly mown hay or grass (phosgene).

Irritants

Irritants or riot control chemicals such as pepper spray cause burning and pain on exposed mucous membranes and skin, eye pain and tearing, burning in the nostrils, respiratory discomfort, and tingling of the exposed skin. Examples include:

- CS (tear gas)
- CR (tear gas)
- CN (mace)
- OC (pepper spray)

Most law enforcement officers are familiar with these chemicals. They are typically used in low concentrations to control uncooperative subjects. However, extremely high concentrations of irritants can cause long-term damage or even death to an unprotected individual. The use of irritants against anyone with respiratory problems can likewise lead to death.

Routes of exposure occur through both skin absorption and inhalation. The effects occur within seconds of exposure, but seldom persist more than a few minutes after exposure has ended. Victim symptoms include an immediate burning sensation of the eyes, coughing, difficulty breathing, involuntary closing of the eyes, and a stinging sensation on moist skin surfaces. Victims may report multiple odors including hair spray and pepper due to the variety of propellants used to dispense these agents.

Chemical Incident Indicators

Some chemical agents have characteristic odors. However, many do not. As a consequence, we often have to rely on other indicators of a chemical attack. Walking around an area of suspected contamination "sniffing" for suspicious odors is a dangerous strategy for detecting the presence of chemical agents. Some agents can't be detected by smell. Among those with a characteristic smell, the volume necessary for detection may also be sufficient to cause injury or death.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Chemical Agents

The advantages and disadvantages of chemical agents are very similar to those of biological agents.

Advantages

- They are relatively easy to make.
- They are available.
- They are inexpensive to fabricate—about $600 per square kilometer of coverage using nerve gas.
- They are spread easily through natural convection or air currents.
- They cause immediate effects on their victims.
- They require decontamination, thus tying up resources.
- They will have a major psychological impact on people.
- Chemical terrorism represents a significant escalation of terrorist action from typical explosive or incendiary attacks.

Disadvantages

- Chemical agents are pound for pound a thousand times less toxic than most biological agents, and must be used in relatively large quantities to be effective. When used in open areas, chemical agents are subject to dispersion by wind and evaporation. The large quantities required create manufacturing and handling problems and increase the risk of detection. It should be noted, however, that some chemical agents—such as chlorine and phosgene—are produced legally for industrial use. The theft or sabotage of these materials during shipment poses a risk that cannot be discounted.
- Terrorists must protect themselves from death or injury from exposure to chemical agents during their fabrication, shipment, or emplacement at the target location.

Conventional Explosives

Conventional Explosives can involve a wide variety of materials from small pipe bombs to large vehicle bombs. The incident may involve an attack against a fixed target or a group of people such as emergency responders. The incident may be an isolated event or may involve secondary devices, booby traps, or suicide bombers.

Historically, bombs have been the weapon of choice for terrorists. Approximately seventy percent of all terrorist incidents involve the use of explosives. Improvised explosives can be designed by terrorists to deliver a wide range of

explosive effects, including providing vehicles for the dispersal of chemical, biological, and radiological materials.

According to the FBI bomb data covering the period 1990 through 1995, there were 10,122 actual bombings (including incendiaries) and another 3,278 failed bomb or incendiary attacks, resulting in 3,176 injuries and 355 deaths.

Both the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings involved detonation of high explosives to cause maximum damage. The World Trade Center bomb contained approximately 1,200 lbs. of Urea Nitrate. The Oklahoma City bomb was approximately 4,800 lbs. of fertilizer grade Ammonia Nitrate and fuel oil. The vehicle bomb used on the barracks in Beirut is believed to have contained approximately 12,000 lbs. of explosives that have not been positively identified.

Explosive Terminology

An understanding of basic definitions, terms, and concepts is essential for developing a complete understanding for and appreciation of the dangers associated with explosives, particularly when used by terrorists to attack their targets.

Explosives are materials capable of violent decomposition. This decomposition often takes the form of instantaneous oxidation (burning). Explosions are the result of sudden and violent release of gas during decomposition of the explosive substances. High temperatures, a strong shock wave, loud noise, and light follow these releases.

Low explosives are better known as propellants. They are designed to burn and produce gas output. Low explosives require confinement to explode. Low explosives are initiated by burning or shock.

High explosives are materials traditionally thought of as explosives. They are designed to actually detonate. High explosives are further categorized by their sensitivities. Examples of high explosives include TNT, dynamite, and plastic explosives.

Low and high explosives respond differently in terms of time for complete reaction, velocity of reaction, and the pressure generated. For example, low explosives burn at a velocity less than the speed of sound; high explosives detonate at velocities higher than the speed of sound. In a high explosive, the fuel and oxidizer are chemically bonded, and the shock wave breaks apart these bonds and re-combines the two materials to produce mostly gasses. Low explosives do not detonate; they burn or undergo oxidation. When heated, the fuel(s) and oxidizer(s) combine to produce heat, light, and gaseous products.

When a device explodes it produces three types of effects, which include blast pressure, fragmentation, and thermal effects.

There are two different phases of blast pressure—positive blast pressure and negative blast pressure.

- Positive blast pressure (overpressure) moves rapidly away from the explosion center (ground zero), exerting pressures of thousands of pounds per square inch due to the expansion caused by the release of energy. This phase of an explosion is considered the primary phase. Think of the thump you feel in your chest when a Fourth of July aerial bomb explodes during a fireworks display; this primary blast wave has a similar effect except the pressure it exerts is thousands of times greater. Although the blast wave usually lasts for no more than five milliseconds, the massive change in air pressure can do great harm to the human body. It can cause myocardial contusion and shearing of the large heart vessels. It can detach the small intestine and colon from their supporting structures and tear the bowel wall, and it can rupture eardrums.

- After the positive pressure phase, negative pressure is created at the explosion site. This phase creates a vacuum that returns air to the original center of the explosion. This phase is less violent but lasts longer.

The explosive device may propel fragments and nearby debris–glass, metal, cement, and wood, for example–at missile-like speed. It's not uncommon for debris near the center of a blast to attain speeds of more than 4,500 feet per second. At that rate, flying debris not only can cause lacerations, abrasions, and contusions with resultant fractures but can penetrate any part of the body.

Sometimes referred to as the incendiary effect, heat produced by the detonation of either high or low explosives varies according to the ingredient materials. High explosives generate greater temperatures than low explosives; however, the thermal effects from low explosives have a longer duration than those of high explosives. The thermal effect is visible in a bright flash or fireball temporarily produced by an explosion. Thermal effects vary by type of explosive, container, addition of fuels/accelerants, shielding, and proximity. Fire and thermal effects are usually localized and short-lived with conventional devices (i.e., those not enhanced for collateral incendiary effects).

Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Explosives

High explosives are classified according to their heat, friction, impact, electrostatic discharge (ESD), and shock.

Primary explosives detonate with very small impetus (spark, flame, or impact). Because of this insensitivity, they are used in the manufacture of detonators (electric or non-electric).

Secondary explosives require a greater impetus than primary explosives to detonate (a detonator filled with a primary explosive to create a shock). Secondary explosives are so insensitive they require a "booster" charge to generate sufficient shock to detonate. ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel oil) fits in this category.

Tertiary explosives require a huge impetus to detonate and often also require significant confinement as well. Explosive devices containing tertiary explosives often also include primary and secondary explosives to generate sufficient impetus to cause detonation. Ammonium nitrate is an example of a tertiary explosive.

Improvised Explosive Devices

Vehicle bombs are usually large, powerful devices that consist of a quantity of explosives fitted with a timed or remotely triggered detonator packed into a car or truck. The two most famous vehicle bombings on United States soil are the World Trade Center bombing in New York and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City.

Pipe bombs are the most common explosive devices. They are at the opposite end of the scale from vehicle bombs in terms of size and destructive potential. Pipe bombs usually consist of a quantity of explosives sealed into a length of metal or plastic pipe. A timing fuse usually controls detonation. Other possible methods include electronic timers, remote triggers, and motion sensors.

The term "satchel charge" derives from an old military term for an explosive device consisting of a canvas pack containing explosives. It is more powerful than a grenade, but can still be thrown. The container may also be packed with antipersonnel materials such as nails or glass to inflict more casualties. A satchel charge was used in the bombing of the "Otherside Lounge" in Atlanta.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Explosives

Advantages

- They are the most effective terrorist weapon because of the extensive damage and the psychological effect.
- They can be a delivery or dispersal system for other WMD materials.
- The unlimited improvised mixes can be hard to trace.
- They can be easily concealed or hidden in everyday use containers.

- Functioning methods are limited only by the imagination of the terrorist.
- With the numerous information courses, they are readily obtainable.

Disadvantages

- Explosives are sensitive to heat, shock, friction, impact, and radio frequency hazards, any one of which can cause a pre-mature detonation resulting in the injury or death of the terrorist. Many terrorists have been maimed or killed due to these hazards.
- Technology has been developed for the detection of explosives.
- Production methods for the numerous mixes of materials can be extremely hazardous due to chemical reactions that occur while blending. This also has caused many premature detonations resulting in the maiming and killing of terrorist.
- The limited shelf life of some explosives can result in the material failing to function or can increase the sensitivity of the explosive, resulting in premature detonation.

DETECTION DELAY

A key concept in weapons of mass destruction is detection delay. Unlike in traditional crimes, or even with terrorist incidents, authorities typically respond to the threat or actual attack. With biological incidents, however, the actual original crime scene—the location where victims were exposed to the agent—may be a considerable distance from the location where the incident is first detected (normally a hospital emergency room or physician's office). Likewise, with some chemical agents, symptoms may not develop for several hours. The actual time and location of the exposure may be difficult to determine.

Different detection delays are associated with WMD incidents. In some cases, the indicators appear immediately. In others, the indicators may not appear until hours, days, weeks, or months after the incident. The formal identification of a WMD incident may take days or weeks, involving comprehensive medical investigation and analyses.

APPENDIX C

Downwind Plots

Although Downwind Plots can be used for biological incidents, they are used most often for chemical and nuclear incidents. The discussion here is not to make you an expert in developing Downwind Plots, or even reading Downwind Plots; the purpose here is to expose you to the fundamentals of these devices so you can make more effective use of them should the need arise.

Chemical Downwind Plots

Chemical Downwind plots are based on the amount of chemicals used and environmental characteristics (wind speed, temperature, terrain, etc.). One of the most important elements in determining how far chemicals will spread is the "Temperature Gradient." This is a complex application of how much rise the chemical cloud will get and how far it is likely to carry in the wind. A rough estimate of the Temperature Gradient can be made from the following guidelines:

- The gradient is Inversion during nighttime hours, particularly clear nights when there is little wind. In these instances, the chemicals will create the greatest amount of contamination and the chemical cloud will travel the greatest distance from the release site.

- The gradient is Lapse during daylight hours (1-2 hours after sunrise to 1-2 hours before sunset), particularly clear days when there is little wind. In these instances, chemicals are quickly dissipated into the air and the chemical cloud will not travel far.

- The gradient is Neutral in between times of Lapse and Inversion and when the wind speed is greater then 5 knots. These conditions also exist on overcast days or during times of precipitation.

Based on this information, a Chemical Downwind Plot can be drawn as shown in Figure B-1 on the following page.

This plot is fairly simple to draw. Place an x at the location of the release. Draw a line from the x in the direction of the wind. Draw a 10 kilometer circle around the x. Draw 2 parallel lines extending from the circle. Draw 2 more lines at 30 degrees from each of the parallel lines. Draw a line perpendicular to these lines at the expected limit of the chemical cloud. For normal ground releases, the cloud can be expected to travel 10-15 kilometers in Lapse, as much as 30

kilometers in Neutral, and 40-50 kilometers in Inversion. Inversion expectations can be extended in the case of the release of a great deal of chemicals (such as a chemical plant incident).



Figure B-1
Chemical Downwind Plot

If this were an aerial release of chemicals (say from a crop duster), the plot would be the same except there would be 2 x circles (one where the spray began and one where the spray ended). The parallel lines would then extend from the upper and lower circles.

Nuclear Downwind Plots

The fallout from a nuclear incident occurs in one of two patterns. If the wind is less than 5 miles per hour, fallout will form in a circular pattern (dependent on actual wind speed, terrain, etc) fairly close to the incident. If the wind is greater than 5 miles per hour, fallout will form in a triangular shaped area and will be blown away from the detonation area (depending on the size of the nuclear materials, wind speed, etc.).

Figure B-2 shows a Nuclear Downwind Plot for a 2 kiloton nuclear explosion (which is about what could be expected from a non-military nuclear device used by terrorists) with a 15 mile per hour wind speed.

There are two zones in this plot (Zone I and Zone II). These correspond to the potential for harm occurring from the nuclear incident. Zone I is the area with the most hazard from the incident. Persons in this area could receive doses of radiation greater than 150 rad in less than 4 hours after the arrival of fallout. Zone II is an area of lesser, but still serious risk. Persons in this area would receive less than 150 rad in 4 hours but could receive a total of 50 rad within the first 24 hours. Anything outside Zone II is considered an insignificant threat. This would be less than 50 rad in the first 24 hours and less than 150 rad total if the persons stayed in the area indefinitely.

The calculated Zone I in this example covers 4 miles; Zone II is out to 8 miles. What can immediately be seen from this drawing is that a small nuclear device may be very harmful, but it will not wipe out a city as is commonly thought. Many of the nuclear strikes used as examples in the media are from military munitions of multiple megaton (not kiloton) size. These weapons can produce tremendous damage. For example, a 15 megaton bomb exploded on a deserted island in the 1950s produced fallout for 20 miles upwind, 320 miles downwind, and 60 miles wide at its largest arc. Most terrorists are not going to be able to obtain, make, or conceal this large a weapon, however; and expected yields of terrorist weapons are much closer to the 2 kiloton device described here. That is the good news. The bad news is that, with a 15 mile per hour wind, all of the effects of the fallout will move to the limits of Zone II in the first hour, so a jail evacuation would have to take place within 1 hour or personnel would begin to receive the effects of fallout.



Figure B-2
Nuclear Downwind Plot

APPENDIX D

Hasty Decontamination Procedures

In the event of exposure to chemical agents, it will be necessary to decontaminate personnel and surfaces with which they will come into contact. As time permits, a detailed decontamination should be undertaken in an attempt to completely remove any hazardous materials; however, a hasty decontamination should be performed as soon as possible for personnel exposed to chemicals and for all surfaces exposed to chemical agents with which personnel will continue to come into contact. This discussion only addresses a hasty decontamination. Please contact the appropriate authorities to conduct a detailed decontamination. The procedures for conducting a hasty decontamination are as follows:

1. Set up the decontamination area such that personnel are upwind of the decontamination site. This will prevent re-contamination from the actions of decontamination. If decontaminating surfaces, begin from the upwind side and move to the downwind side.

2. Make sure to trench, dam, or otherwise prevent water used in the decontamination from running off from the decontamination site. Also make provisions to dispose of the water or maintain it until it can be dealt with by the appropriate authorities.

3. Personnel should remove all clothing, being careful not to touch the clothing with bare hands and to not allow the clothes to touch skin. The general procedure is to start at the top (shirt) and remove clothes in layers (i.e. first outer clothes, then underwear). It is best to roll the clothes off the body to prevent touching the skin. It may be best to cut off bras and underwear to prevent contamination.

4. Scrub the skin with soap and water or a sodium hypochlorite solution. Do not just let water run over the body; use a stiff brush and scrub the skin thoroughly. Also flush the eyes with water.

5. If possible, follow washing with soap and water with a solution of sodium hypochlorite. To make a sodium hypochlorite, mix 1 part household bleach with 10 parts water. If using this solution, wash with soap and water and then rinse with the solution. Leave the solution on the body for 10-15 minutes. Then rinse with hot water.

6. To decontaminate clothing, use undiluted bleach and allow it to remain in contact with the clothing for at least 30 minutes.

APPENDIX E

FACILITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

As with most surveys that involve a threat, the first step in the process of a facility survey is evaluating the threat. After that, the following information should be considered in assessing the vulnerability of the facility.

Identification of the Facility

- Provide the name of the facility and its location/address (including the city and country).
- Identify the facility on an area map. Delineate the perimeter, if any. Identify other high-risk facilities nearby.
- Does the proximity of other buildings affect the primary facility? If so, provide a brief identification of the adjoining buildings as follows:
    - Provide a general description of the building (commercial, residential, military).
    - Provide the dimensions of the building.
    - Identify the owner of the building. Provide contact numbers for the owner during duty and after duty hours.

Description of the Facility

- **Layout of the Facility**
    - Give the dimensions of the facility.
    - Determine what the building is made of (brick, wood, concrete, or other material). Estimate how easily it could be penetrated or burned. Obtain estimates from explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) on bomb damage estimates if possible.
    - Get a blueprint of the facility, including revisions if the facility has been updated. If a blueprint is not available, make a sketch of the building floor plans.
    - Identify any safe rooms in the facility and their size.
    - Identify any elevators, hallways, and stairs and whether any of these affect security.
    - Identify where inmates are housed and classification level.

- **Entry and Access to the Facility**
    - Determine the security of the facility's perimeter, including what type of material is used on the perimeter (chain link fence, wood, brick, etc.).

- Identify entrances on the perimeter and whether or not they are guarded.
- Identify any mechanical barriers in place and if they function properly.
- Identify foot patrols or observation platforms.

- **Entrances**
  - Identify the main, alternate, and emergency entrances.
  - Identify any observation systems used at the entrance.
  - Identify all windows.
  - Identify any video observation, whether it is constantly manned, whether it is maneuverable, and any noticeable blind spots.
  - Identify the material the entrances are made of, their thickness, and whether they are hollow or solid core.
  - Identify the types of lock used (i.e., deadbolt) and how difficult they are to defeat.
  - Identify any fire escapes or ladders, whether they are permanently attached or pull-down steps, and access to them.
  - Identify any access to the roof, any vents and skylights, and any access that might be gained from the roof.

- **Windows**
  - Identify the number of windows and their affect on vulnerability.
  - Identify the type of window (single, double, or triple-pane).
  - Determine the visibility from outside and whether draperies or curtains would help.
  - Determine whether there are metal or wood frames.
  - Identify how the windows are locked and how difficult they are to defeat.
  - Identify any bars, screens, Mylar, or any combination of these materials used for security and how secure this material is.

- **Utilities**
  - Identify utilities that service the facility (electric, gas, water, etc.).
  - Identify all electrical grids, switches, fuse boxes, etc. for the facility and its security.
  - Identify whether utilities can be shut off and from where, what back-up systems are in place, and who would repair the different systems.
  - Identify the POCs for utility companies and any security managers.
  - Identify the emergency power supply and what happens if it goes out.

- **Security Systems and Lighting**
  - Identify the location of all lights (on the facility, within the perimeter, on nearby buildings).
  - Identify any blind spots.
  - Determine when lights are turned on and off and who controls them.

Communications

- Determine the type of phone system (single line or multi-line) and where each phone is located.
- Determine how many lines there are and how easy they would be to cut.
- Determine if there are microwave stations used to control the phone lines, and if so where they are located and who would repair them if they go out.
- Determine if the facility uses computers to control the phone lines and who would repair the system if it goes down.
- Identify the types of available radio communication and styles (e.g., hand-held).
- Determine the range of reception of radios.

Emergency Equipment

- Identify the location of fire alarms, water hoses, and fire extinguishers, whether they work, and whether practice drills are done.
- Determine the location of first aid kits and medical facilities.
- Identify where the intrusion and fire detection systems are located, what type system it is (electronic, battery), the effectiveness of the system, and whether the police or fire department are automatically notified.
- Identify the locations of police stations, which one will respond if there is an incident, the response time, how the police will be contacted, and shift changes for the police.
- Identify the locations of fire stations, their capabilities (will ladders reach the top of the facility?), which one will respond if there is an incident, the response time, how they will be contacted, and shift changes.
- Identify the locations of hospitals, the capabilities of the hospital (can they handle trauma care), the time required to reach the hospital, Medivac capabilities and the location of landing zones, how the hospital can be contacted, and shift changes.

Duress Codes

- Determine if duress codes exist, the procedures once the duress code is given, how the codes are disseminated, how often they are changed, and if there are any duress exercises.

Access to the Facility

- Evaluate the terrain surrounding the facility, looking out and toward the facility.
- Determine what can be seen from the facility and any blind spots.
- Determine anything that can provide cover and concealment for someone approaching the facility; consider removing it.
- Identify any obstacles, natural or man-made, that will hinder an approach to the facility or block vision from the facility.
- Identify any features of the terrain that might affect security.
- Identify all access routes, vehicle and pedestrian, to the facility, which way traffic runs, congestion areas (choke points, traffic signals), rush hours, transportation pickup points (e.g., bus stops, taxi stands, mass transit stations) and if it is normal for people to congregate in these areas.
- Where parking areas are located, any controls on access, designated parking versus open parking, proximity to the facility, and any security issues from parking.
- Are there security personnel at each entrance and does security rely on a vehicle sticker, driver and passenger identification, or both? Is there 100% ID check – or what percentage or method is used?
- Identify the type of identification required for visitors, who issues the ID, and potential to make counterfeit IDs.
- Determine if personal or vehicle searches are performed upon entry, who performs the search, and how thoroughly the searches are conducted.
- Determine whether vendors are escorted at all times and if the escort policy is always followed.
- Determine how the delivery of mail and packages is handled, if there is a loading dock, and whether searches are conducted at the perimeter of the facility or at the loading dock.

Threat to Logistics and Resources

- **Transportation:**
  - What is used for transportation on the facility (passenger cars, vans, buses, etc.)?
  - What is used to transport personnel off the facility?
  - Which vehicles carry communication equipment?
  - Who maintains the vehicles? If non-law enforcement, have background checks been done? If contracted, who is the company POC? Who is the security manager? What is the maintenance schedule of the vehicles? What percentage of the vehicles is in good to excellent working order?
  - Where are the vehicles stored when not in use? Consider doing a facility survey for a vehicle storage site. Emphasis should be placed on who has access to the vehicles.

- Are there any specially equipped vehicles (armor plating, bullet resistant glass, protective radiator shield, etc.)?
- What plans exist for a loss of transport capability?
- Who are the drivers? If non-law enforcement, have background checks been done? If contracted, who is the company POC? Who is the security manager? What training do the driver's receive?

- **Water:**
  - Identify the sources of water, water storage sites, and their locations (local procurement, treatment plants, wells, local and outside storage).
  - What are the plans to acquire emergency supplies?
  - Conduct a facility survey of water storage sites.

- **Food Supplies:**
  - Identify and evaluate the sources of food supplies.
  - Is tampering with the food supplies possible?
  - How is the food delivered to the facility? Are there vulnerabilities due to the delivery method? Consider doing a route survey for the delivery route of the food supplies.
  - Do a facility survey for these facilities.
  - What are the plans for bringing in emergency food supplies?

APPENDIX F

GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE EXERCISES

Types of Exercises That Should Be Undertaken

- Tabletop Training Exercise (TTX): Uses scenarios to evaluate plans, command and control, and coordination. Can also evaluate whether necessary resources are available.

- Situational Training Exercise (STX): Similar to a TTX but with some limited play by field personnel. Evaluates logistics (communications, routes, etc.), clarity of roles of personnel, whether plans can be implemented in reality, and capabilities of personnel.

- Field Training Exercise (FTX): Full-run exercise using all necessary personnel, logistics, and resources. Inclusion of inmates as a part of the exercise is possible with careful pre-planning. The most realistic exercise will yield the most realistic results; however, inclusion of actual inmates, even at the lowest custody level, involves some degree of risk.

Goals of Exercises

- Evaluate effectiveness of the plan; identify any problem areas, suggest solutions.

- Evaluate command staff's ability to quickly respond to notification of a hazardous incident.

- Identify and clarify roles and responsibilities of participants.

- Evaluate skills, abilities, and performance of participants.

- Evaluate availability and appropriateness of logistics (communications, transportation, security, etc.).

- Evaluate availability and appropriateness of resources (food, water, facilities, etc.).

- Get feedback on how any shortcomings can be resolved.

- Increase teamwork and confidence of participants that the plan can be carried out.

Things to Avoid in Exercises

- Exercise is not a test. Participants should feel that they can fail without repercussions. Exercises should only determine effectiveness of current plan and identify weaknesses that should be overcome.

- Do not make the exercise too complex. Yes, many problems do test many areas, but it makes the exercise unrealistic and begins to destroy the morale of participants.

- Do not stick to a strict time clock. Do not be afraid to suspend the exercise and correct issues or stop and discuss what happened or what should happen.

APPENDIX G

MODEL POLICY FOR JAIL EVACUATION

PROCEDURE *(for Monmouth County Correctional Institution – MCCI)*

Phase 1:

A. Code 200-Terrorist Attack

1. Code 200 is called in with location (if known) to Central Control.

a. Using 2-tone radio announcement, Central Control shall re-state code 200 giving a specific location.

b. Watch Commander: Notifies the Maintenance Department to immediately shut down the air handlers throughout the entire institution.

c. Watch Commander: Lock down entire inmate population and no staff will be allowed to leave for any reason. Secure inmate or inmates involved in incident if possible. The watch commander will also order all staff to stay in their assigned areas with the exception of the officers in the immediate area of the incident. The reason for this is so no one that is not contaminated yet does not become contaminated.

d. Watch Commander: Watch Commander will assign the F- Escort Officer to start a log of events. This person will also coordinate the calling of off duty staff, in the event that the threat is real. The Emergency call-in will begin with those who live closest to the institution and work outward and shall continue until a sufficient number of personnel have arrived. Supervisors from the on coming shifts will also be ordered to report.

THE PHONE MESSAGE SHALL BE:
"THIS IS THE JAIL, WE HAVE AN EMERGENCY REPORT IMMEDIATELY," "DO NOT CALL BACK, JUST REPORT IN."

e. Watch Commander: _will notify the Police Radio Room. He will notify the dispatcher to dispatch the following agencies, County HAZ-MAT, County Office of Emergency Management (OEM), County Prosecutors & the Sheriff's Mobile Command Unit. . He should also advise them to

place the 3 local Fire companies & local first aid squads on a stand-by status.

f. Watch Commander: will then notify the Sheriff, Under-Sheriff, Warden, Deputy Warden & Captains. He should advise them of the events that have already taken place.

g. Watch Commander: The Watch commander will use the group page numbers to page the MCCI C.E.R.T., DIVE TEAM & MCSO S.E.R.T.. These teams should respond immediately to the institution. The Cert Commander will set up a location to have all credentials checked upon arrival of all outside agencies with the assistance of the OEM Office. The CERT Commander will set up two sniper personnel. One above the L&M roof and one above the Maintenance roof. **NOTE: SNIPER PERSONNEL SHALL ONLY FIRE UPON DIRECTION FROM THE SHERIFF, UNDERSHERIFF, WARDEN OR DEPUTY WARDEN UNLESS FIRED UPON.**

h. By the direction of the warden the shifts will be changed to 12 hour shifts. This will assist in the relief factor and the remote location in the event that this becomes a long-term evacuation.

Phase 2:

1) If Sheriff's Office, the County Prosecutor's Office & the County Health Dept. Haz-Mat Team determines that the threat is creditable and a field test of the substance is positive, the following procedures will take place ASAP.

   a) OEM will advise the armory to advise them that we will be transporting inmates within the next few hours also advise the state police that the National Guard will be needed as well as the state police or county helicopter. The OEM Director will need to immediately set up a Unified Command Center. OEM Coordinator will also need to arrange for the Monmouth County Scat busses to be available for transport. The Salvation Army will also be needed to supply bedding and assist with the needs of the inmates while at the armory.

   b) Field Com needs to set up two incident commands one at the Courthouse or JCPL parking lot and the other at the armory. The forward command center located at the JCPL parking lot will have a representative from each agency to make decisions as the evacuation unfolds. The Monmouth County Correctional Warden will assign a Captain or Lieutenant to take the position of incident commander. They will also notify the county helicopter in order to assist in this

evacuation. All K-9 teams with utility dogs in the Monmouth County area will be dispatched and all ocean and Middlesex County dogs should be placed on a stand-by status. East Freehold Vol. Fire Co. will be the first dispatched. Local Fire and First aid squads as well as the MON-OC Paramedic Mobile Triage center will also be dispatched to assist in this operation. One truck will be needed to hook into a hydrant to supply the decon unit with water. The unit will be set up upon the arrival of the Monmouth County Health Department. This will take place in the vehicle yard located in the rear of MCCI.

c) The NJ Department Of Corrections Special Operations Group as well as the MCSO S.E.R.T. will be dispatched and directed to report to the Courthouse / School house parking lot incident command. These teams will Provide security throughout the transportation route from MCCI to the remote location. As well as provide a perimeter around the remote location.

d) All incoming staff will be instructed to report to the armory. Those Officers who are qualified with weapons will be required to report with their weapons.

e) The incident commander will dispatch all specialized teams to report to the armory and MCCI. These Officers will set up a perimeter around the armory as well as obtain vehicles for the escort of inmates from MCCI to the Armory.

f) The MCCI Medical Staff should be called in as well as the medical staff from Monmouth County Youth Detention. They will report to the JCPL parking lot incident command post.

g) The MCCI Medical doctor should be notified of the situation. The medical doctor should work with the Monmouth County Health Department to administer treatment as needed. He should also direct the medical staff in setting up a remote triage unit at the armory.

h) The food service manager will be notified to report with his entire staff to the courthouse / school house parking lot incident command. He will implement the Emergency / Contingency plan that was submitted to this department by his company and follow that for plan for at least 48-72 hrs.

i) The MCCI computer specialists will be notified to report to the Courthouse / school house parking lot incident command. He will be instructed to set up access to the institutions booking and medical

computer systems. The Booking inmate records can be accessed from three locations.

1) Sheriffs Office.
2) Sheriff's Youth Detention Center.
3) Sheriff's ID Bureau.

j) The MCCI inmate medical records can be accessed from the MCCI Physicians office via computer.

All inmate records obtained as listed above will be accessible to the remote location via Fax, E-Mail or hand delivered by Sheriff's Office personnel.

Phase 3:

1) With the direction from the Incident Commander, the Monmouth County Health Department's Haz-Mat Team will begin the decontamination of staff and inmates.

a) The inmates in the surrounding housing units in the location of the incident, as well as the inmates involved will be considered contaminated.

1) All contaminated inmates will be stripped of clothing and ordered to shower six at a time in the housing unit. They will then be escorted to the lower level via the maintenance stairwell and will exit the receiving gates no more than six at a time where they will again be decontaminated by the HAZ-MAT team.

2) After all contaminated inmates are decontaminated in the housing units; the showers used will have bleach poured into the drainage system in order to prevent further contamination.

b) All other inmates will be considered exposed.

1) All inmates considered exposed will be escorted around the contaminated area if possible. They will be escorted 22 inmates at a time to the lower level via the maintenance stairwell to be decontaminated by the Haz-Mat Team.

2) After decontamination all inmates, weather exposed or contaminated will be changed into ty-vek suits obtained by the Monmouth County Health Department. They will then be cuffed

and shackled using Flex Cuffs and identified for transportation to the remote location.

c) Decontamination of staff:

1) All Civilian Staff will be decontaminated first and removed from the building. Social Workers and Mental Health will be ordered to report to the Armory.

2) All contaminated Staff will be stripped of clothing and ordered to shower in a housing unit or (staff locker room). They will then be escorted to the lower level via the maintenance stairwell were they will again be decontaminated by the HAZ-MAT team.

3) All staff will be transported to Armory, seen by medical staff and treatment will administered by the MCCI medical staff and Monmouth County Health Department.

Phase 4:

1) Transporting and housing of inmates at the remote location.

a) All inmates being transported to the remote location will be hand cuffed and shackled using Flex Cuffs.

b) Transport busses leaving MCCI with inmates will have three escorts. The busses will have two armed officers and one unarmed on board. One armed officer will be the driver.

1) One marked police vehicle to be the lead vehicle with two handgun and shotgun qualified officers.

2) One marked police vehicle to be a chase vehicle with two handgun and shotgun qualified officers.

3) (1) helicopter whether Monmouth County or State police will monitor by air the transport of inmates to the remote location on board will be the Sheriff or designee to monitor this operation.

c) Sheriff units and local police departments will Stage vehicles throughout the Transportation route as extra security measures to prevent escape as well as to maintain a clear path for the transportation vehicles to the remote location.

a) Housing of inmates at the remote location:

b) Upon the arrival of inmates to the armory, the following inmate classification areas will be set up as follows:

1) Administration Segregation Inmates
2) Special Needs
3) Female inmates
4) Medical
5) General population

2) All inmates regardless of classification status will remain shackled. The only inmates to be unshackled are those ordered by the MCCI Physician.

3) Officers will complete a headcount of inmates in their sections every thirty minutes.

4) Formal name counts will be conducted three times per twelve-hour shift. Either a lieutenant or sergeant will directly supervise all formal name counts. This will continue on permanent basis until the contacts can be made to activate the mutual aid agreements between other state and county correctional facilities.

Refer to the New Jersey County Jail Emergency Data Sheets Attached.

1) After 72 hrs if the facility is not cleared by the state and federal agencies, transportation of inmates to the mutual aid facilities will begin.

2) If the facility is cleared of contamination by the state and federal agencies, the inmates will be returned in the reverse order as stated above in Phase 4.

5) A multi-unit perimeter patrol with a minimum of four patrol vehicles with one officer in each will be established to patrol the surrounding perimeter of the remote location. This may be upgraded as the need arises.

NOTE: An initial emergency package consisting of the following will be stored at the Juvenile Detention Center:

1) Emergency PPE Equipment
2) Original copies of all institutional paperwork
3) Flex cuffs
4) Ty-vek suits

5) All non-essential supplies will be obtained through the other divisions of this office.

Revised 04/29/03

**NOTE:* *The preceding policy is from the Monmouth County Sheriff's Office and is used with permission from Sheriff Joseph Oxley.*